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The Atlantic salmon has been described by Netboy as "one of the
noblest and most honoured (as well as the most harried) fishes known to man.
Born in some humble river it tarries there for one to four years and having
attained the size of a man’s finger it vanishes into the ocean only to return to
this same stream a few years later as a full grown adult. It provides sport for
kings and its pink flesh is like no other". (1)
When man first inhabited Europe the salmon were plentiful in
hundreds of coastal rivers. They were found in all Northern European countries
including Western Russia. They occurred in Greenland and in all suitable waters
on the North American side of the Atlantic ocean from Ungava Bay in the south
to the most northern of the Canadian rivers.
With the growth of population, the spread of agriculture and the
coming of the Industrial Revolution, man, increasingly tampered with the salmon’s
habitat and the leaping fishes could no longer thrive in their traditional haunts.
Nowadays they have become increasingly scarce and expensive, having deserted
or been forced out of one river after another. To mention but a few, salmon no
longer come up the Seine or the Moselle in France, the Douro in Portugal, the
Elbe and Weser in Germany, the Kemi and Kokemaki in Finland and many Swedish
Baltic rivers. The Vistula’s runs have dropped substantially, 100 mercury
polluted salmon were taken from the Rhine (once probably the most productive
(i) Netboy, A. The Atlantic Salmon - A Vanishing Species, Faber and
Faber, London, 1967.
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river in Europe) in 1972 and in the Thames the last naturally produced salmon is
reported to have been caught in 1833. The species has utterly vanished from
Portugal, Switzerland, the low countries and is in danger of extinction in France
and Spain. In North America, salmon have deserted such major rivers as the
Connecticut, Pinobscot, Merrimack and Kennebec not to mention many less famous
streams in the maritime provinces of Canada. The Miramichi in New Brunswick,
for many years the greatest salmon river in the world, has now less fish than the
Foyle. Inshore netting has been abolished in most Canadian rivers and vast
sums of money are being spent in transporting salmon upstream past numerous
power plants and dams. Still the salmon are slow in returning, and this situation
will continue unless some means of controlling the heavy and prolonged drift netting
off the Newfoundland bank.
No nation however has frittered away its Atlantic salmon wealth more
wantonly than the USA. When the first settlers came, the New England rivers
were full of salmon but by 1850 the fish had almost completely disappeared. Power
dams, pollution and water control schemes, rather than over fishing were the
causes of this distruction. Attempts are now being made to restore the salmon
in some rivers but these attempts are almost hopeless. The pollution continues
unabated and legislation to prevent the erection of dams is continually being
circumvented.
The lesson to be learned from all this is that salmon stocks can
easily be destroyed over large areas and if this is allowed to happen, attempts
at restoration are almost impossible. The causes of the distruction become
entrenched with vested interests which are difficult to dislodge.
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Despite the above statements the overall world salmon catch as recorded
by FAO has not declined over the years (see Table 1). What seems to have been
happening is a redistribution of stocks between different countries. This however
should not make us feel complacent. The methods of catching are now far more
sophisticated than in the past, and this combined with more prolonged effort means
that Mgher and higher proportions of the available fish are removed each year.
Furthermore the statistics on landings are now more complete, so that increased
catches in some areas are probably due to better recording rather than to better
fishing. The upshot of all this is that the catch figures must be interpreted with
caution; the fact that they are remaining fairly stable does not mean that stocks are
also stable. The best authorities are of opinion that stocks are declining and unless
realistic action is taken, particularly on the high seas, the salmon will eventually
be fished to extinction.
Salmon in Ireland
The figures in Table 2 show that for Ireland as a whole, total salmon catches
have not declined over the years. Decreases in the Foyle area, particularly since
the high runs in the 1960s, have been counterbalanced by high catches in the Republic.
Unfortunately however the increased landings in the South have been entirely due to
the drift netting; both draft net and angling catches have declined in recent years.
These declines as well as those in the Foyle are due in part to the UDN disease, but
more particularly to the drift netters, who unless controlled, pose a serious threat
to all Irish salmon stocks.
With regard to the Foyle fishery, the table shows that there has been a serious
decline in recent years, in all three components of the commercial fishery i.e. drift
net, draft net and particularly the Commission’s own private fishery catch. Without
the revenue from the last source, the Commission must become more and more
Table 1: Atlantic salmon landings in selected years, 1938-1973.
Country 1938 1948 1958 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969    1970    1971 1972    1973
(’000 metric tons)
Canada 4.0 3.0 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.5 2.1
Denmark 0.1 1.0 1.1 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.7
Finland 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 IF/0.6 0.4 0.5 F/0.5
France , 0.1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Germany (Fed. Rep.) 0.1 d 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Greenland n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.5 0.8 1.2 1.3 0.6 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6
Iceland & Faeroe Is. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.1 0.2 n.a. 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4
Ireland 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.6 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.1 ~ 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.9
Norway 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.0
Poland d n.a. 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Sweden 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 ¯ 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7
USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9
UK England & Wales~ 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.5
UK Scotland [ 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.3 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7
/
UK Northern Ireland J 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total ¯ 9.0 10.0    8.0    8.0 11.0 10.0 13.0 12.3 12.3 14.5 12.6 13.2 12.5 11.8 12.1 14.4
negligible
F/ Data estimated or calculated by FAO
m
n.a. Not available.
Table 2: Salmon landings in Ireland.
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
196i
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Irish Republic Foyle Fisheries
Commercial Commercial
Drift Other Angling Total Drift Londonderry Other Angling TotalTotal
Nets Nets
Total ’
Nets Fishing Nets
234.6
250.7
298.4
286:1
’352.5
263.5
218.2
606.8
687.2
761.6
795.0
744.0
1 015.7
1 040.4
1 678.5
1 730.9
1 651.2
2 347.1
2626.0
3 175.0
780.2
1,028.3
1,191.7
992.4
2,004.4
870.4
934.0
1,999.4
1 807.9
1 861.1
1 658.0
1 280.8
1 437.3
1 410.2
1 543.1
1.642.7
1 507.8
1 154.9
1 163.0
1 088.0
(’ooo) Ib
1 014.8
1 279.0
1 490.1
1 278.5
1 364.5
1 133.9
1 152.2
2 606.2
2 495.1
2,622.6
2 453.0
2 024.8
2 453.0
2 450.6
3 221.6
3 373.6
3 159.0
3 502.0
3 789.0
4 263.0
247
264
309
375
260
230
193
258
342
390
416
302
268
251
182
137
134
188
206
129
1 261
1 443
1 800
1 654
1 624
1 364
1 346
2 864
2 837
3 013
2 869
2,326
2,721
2,702
3,4O4
3,511
3,293
3,690
2,995
4,392
5,133 ii
9,697 9
10,640 18
8,530 15
8,516 12
13,517 8
11,252 8
38,109 19
48,230 14
52,585 16
28,375 ii,
40,850 i0,
53,270 13
50,530 18.
42,800 12.
55,220 II.
36,240 I0
31,630 6
25,810 7
33,441 6
846
435
978
950
065
955
767
744
040
500
590
940
010
070
O90
010
350
72O
735
991
34,871
44,228
69,822
69.140
51.849
52.548
40.681
63.947
61.710
80.450
53.720
, 56,300
61.350
53.530
52 010
47 420
37 300
31 180
28 25O
35,608
No.
t
51,850
63,360
99,440
9,300
72,430
75,020
60,700
121,800
123.980
149.635
93.685
108.090
127.640
122.130
106.900
113.650
83.910
69.530
61.800
76,040
1,320
3,527
3,390
3,120
570
1,500
1,ooo
i 060
1,945
4,349
5,100
1,524
2,371
630
434
674
4O0
850
1, oz8
1,967
53170
56840
102 830
96 740
73 000
76 520
61 700
122 860
125 925
153 984
98 785
109 614
130 070
122 760
107 335
I14 320
84310
70380
62 818
78,007
Source: Annual Sea and Inland Fisheries Repots of Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, Dublin.
Foyle Fisheries Commission Annual R~ports and Communications from G.D.F. Hadoke, Secretary,
Foyle Fishery Conunission.
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dependent on Government subventions. The drop in the Commission’s own catch, has,
in part, been deliberate. Angling catches had declined seriously after 1967 and the
Commission felt that in order to protect stocks it should curtail its own netting and
allow more fish up river to spawn. Published figures seem to indicate that this policy
has paid off. Angling catches appear to have started to improve again and if this trend
continues, the Commission may soon be able to increase its operations. Unfortunately,
however, there is some reason to believe that improvement in the angling catch is more
apparent than real. The angling figures are based on a postal su~cey of licence holders
and in the past the response rate was very poor (less than 15%). In the last few years,
reminders have been sent out to all non-respondents and as a result the response rate
has now gone up to about 50 per cent with a consequent increase in the catch figures.
The latter figures therefore may not show the correct trend, but despite this I understand
that there has been some improvement in the angling. The catch per angling licence has
improved in recent years, and this is a good indication.
The apparent improvement in angling catches in 1973 and 1974 must not, however,
allow us to become complacent. The high drift net catch, both off Burtonport and the
Foyle, pose a threat to Foyle stocks and it is my opinion that these operations should
be subjected to more adequate controls. The Governments of both the Republic and
Northern Ireland have taken steps in recent years to peg down numbers of net licences
according to certain criteria, but much more needs to be done. They should take a
lesson from the Canadian experience and be somewhat ruthless in this regard. Nor
should they be over-influenced by many of the arguments put forward by the drifters,
particularly, where as is often the case, the latter can earn sufficient income from other
fishing, and they would not suffer undue losses if their salmon operations were curtailed.
Even the regional hardship argument is only partly valid. The offshore catch simply
results in reduced incomes and employment for inshore netsmen and for those who
provide services to anglers.
There is also little merit in the argument, that expansion of sea netting of
salmon is justified as a means of expanding Irish sea fishing on a broader basis for
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other species. The total earnings from salmon is small and in the long run the Irish
sea fishing industry would be better served by a vessel subsidy programme, training
schools and other actions to provide direct incentives for increased activities in salt-
water fisheries that can stand increased pressure. Finally, in this connection I would
state as my opinion that if the salmon stocks of this island are to be completely safe-
guarded, large scale highly organised drift netting would need to be banned entirely.
Small scale drift and draft netting if properly controlled as in the past, pose no serious
threat. Despite these arguments, however, it will be politically difficult to curb the
drift netting, and until such time as this happens, the Foyle management will have
to cope as best it can with the situation,
Because of the serious decline in angling catches between 1967 and 1972 it is
still feared that escapement is not sufficient to maintain stocks, and some people have
suggested that there should be a very severe or even complete ban on netting in the
estuary. This however would be a very drastic step and it is doubtful if it would be
very beneficial in the long run. The argtunents against a complete closure of the
net fishery are:
.
.
Salmon netting provides income for people in depressed
areas of Northern Ireland and the abolition of netting
would reduce considerably the income of.these people.
In 1973, the 282 licence holders, other than drift netters,
in the public Foyle Fishery caught 28,000 salmon valued
at about £144,000. The income from salmon fishing
per licence holder was therefore about £500. Even
allowing for the fact that there is more than one person
per licence this is a substantial income for such people
and in its absence the government would have to provide
alternative employment which might be difficult to find.
The net fishery operated by the Foyle Fishery Commission
provides considerable funds which are pooled with other
Commission revenue to pay for management mid protection
of the whole fishery. If all net fishing were to be abolished
these funds would have to be provided by the two governments
out of general taxation, and there are many who would argue
that this would be an unjust tax; that the PeOPle who gain
from the angling should pay for it. The latter argument
could of course be countered in various ways but it can be
taken that if all the money for management and protection
had to come from public funds, the service provided would
not be very good and the angling would probably be worse
that it is at present.
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The strongest argument in favour of a net fishery however
is related to the value of salmon as a food fish. If the
supply of this food were to be curtailed locally, prices
would go so high that it would become absolutely impossible
to contain poaching at any acceptable level. Even at
present, poaching is taking on fairly serious proportions
but if netting were abolished the poachers would take over
where the netters left off and the last stage would be worse
than the first. On this ground alone, therefore, a policy
for the complete banning of netting even if politically possible,
could hardly be justified. There are various ways of
controlling the net intake without imposing an outright ban.
The degree of control which should be exercised is therefore the crucial
question. What proportions should be taken by the Commission’s own fishery, by the
public drift and draft nets, and allowed up river for angling and spawning? In the
ultimate analysis this is a political question and I can do no more than state certain
guiding principles and give my own opinions for what they are worth. As Crutchfield
says(2) (about fishery management), "it is unlikely that a unique optimal solution
can be found; thus a cluster of generally acceptable packages of goals, and programmes
for their achievement, may well offer a choice to be determined ultimately by political
palatability".
Available Packages
If a fishery is regulated so as to maximise the total output of fish over time
the management would concentrate on having a relatively large net fishery and a
relatively low escapement up river for spawning. In such circumstances the up
river angling would be poor. In other words, quality angling demands that more fish
be available up stream than are required for optimal spawning escapement. The
Foyle Commission must therefore decide whether it should aim at maximising total
fish output, go for quality angling, or for an intermediate policy.
(2) Crutchfield, J.A. - "Economic and Political Objectives in Fishery Management",
Transactions of the American Fishery Society, Vol. 1, 102, 1973.
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Fishery economists tell us that social and economic benefits, and
not fish numbers, are the desired outputs to be maximised, that if the
value of a block of fish is greater when taken by anglers than by netsmen,
then a smaller catch from a mixed fishery would yield greater total benefits
than a larger catch from a mainly net fishery. Also the greater the proportion
of fish allowed to reach the rod fishery, the safer the stock.
In our studies of salmon fishing in the Republic we examined this
question in some detail by making an economic evaluation of angling and
commercial fishing. As the methods of making such evaluations may be of
some interest I will describe briefly how we did the studies and the problems
encountered, both conceptual and practical.
In the case of the commercial fishing, no great conceptual problems
were encountered. The value of the fishing to an individual fisherman is the
value of the fish caught less the cost of catching. The value to the state is a
somewhat different concept, being the value of the fish less any imports required
in catching them. As the imports required in the commercial catching of fish
are rather small, the value to the state can usually be taken as the value of the
fish.
The economic evaluation of angling is however a more complex
question. Certainly, the value of an angling site cannot be approximated by the
value of the fish caught, and in many cases the amount spent by anglers is not a
good representation either. S~rictly speaking the amenity value of a resource
is the amount of money which people are willing to pay for the use of it. The
difficulty however is to detemnine the magnitude of this payment° In some cases
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the users spend very little in connection with the amenity, but nevertheless
it may provide them with great mental and physical relaxation for which many
of them would pay highly if they had to, and would object strenously if its
existence were threatened.
In this connection, the Netherlands situation is worthy of mention.
For some time employers in that country have found it difficult to employ
workers unless outdoor recreational facilities are provided. This is particularly
true in the densely populated, heavily polluted Rotterdam area. As a result~
policy in that country is now strongly oriented towards the provision of recreational
facilities in conjunction with all urban employment projects. Money for this is
usually provided by private business and industry, but in the period 1960-1969
the Netherlands government itself budgeted some £1.9 million for outdoor
recreation. Governments in less densely populated countries are not yet
faced with such acute problems, but those who must provide or restore outdoor
recreation in urban areas find that the costs of such projects can be enormous.
Hence, regardless of the amounts actually spent, by users, potential values
based on experience of similar amenities in other countries must always
be considered.
Various methods of determining peoples "willingness to pay for
an amenity" have been put forward from time to time. The most widely used
is that suggested by Clawson(3) in which the costs of visiting a site from
different distances are used to derive a demand curve from which the value
of the resource can be estimated by assuming different levels of entrance fees, (4)
(3)
Clawson, Marion - "Methods of measuring the demand for the value of
outdoor recreation", Resources for the Future Inc. Washington DC,
Reprint No, 10, 1959.
(4) O’Connor, et al - "An Economic Evaluation of Irish Salmon Fishing:
H The Irish Anglers" - The Economic and Social Research Institute,
Paper No. 75, June 1974.
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This method works well for resources in remote areas to which people travel
long distances. It is not very suitable however for evaluating the value of urban
facilities, which can be visited by large crowds at very small cost.
For amenities such as the latter, other methods of evaluation have to
be used. One method is to ask people how much they would be willing to pay
for the resource if they had to pay. This method usually gives a minimum value
since people who are already enjoying a cheap resource are seldom prepared
to admit that they would pay high admission or licence fees for it. Another
method is to ask people what compensation they would expect if they were asked
to give up the amenity. The answer to this question usually gives a maximum
value. Once the word compensation is mentioned, people are prepared to ask
the maximum.
The true answer lies somewhere between these two extremes, but
it is difficult to say where. The difference is usually very wide so that the
selection of one intermediate point rather than another could make a big difference
to the result. Psychologists are now working on batteries of questions which they
hope will elicit fairly good answers, but these newer methods are still undeveloped.
In the South of Ireland, salmon anglers, both home as well as
[
foreign, travel fairly long distances for their fishing and for that reason we
used the total expenditure of the anglers as a basis for estimating the value of
the angling, while, for the commercial fishermen we used the value of the fish.
v
These figures were however adjusted in various ways to take account of imports,
and multiplier effects, but in the final analysis we gave a series of values which
could be used for different purposes. One of these estimates showed that
the value of salmon angling to the Republic in 1970 was about £1.25 million
while that of commercial fishing was put at £1.9 million giving a total for the
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industry in that year of about £3.1 million. As this figure included a
multiplier effect we considered it to be a maximum value. When the multiplier
effect however was omitted the value came to about £2 million which is
probably a minimum value.
Having made calculations we used the figures obtained to compare
angling and commercial fishing in the national economy. I quote from our
conclusions: (5)
"The relative merits of angling versus all commercial
fishermen are difficult to assess. As was shown above, angling
is far from being a mere hobby; it is a valuable source of income,
employment and export earnings. However, this case must not
be overstated. Over-zealous advocates of angling sometimes do
this by quoting the value of a salmon to a commercial fisherman
as being, perhaps, £2, while to a foreign angler the same fish
is worth over £100 (in the sense that the total expenditure by all
foreign anglers divided by their catch gives an average of over
£100). The fallacy in this argument is in its implications
rather than in its facts, for it implies that if one more salmon
is let up the river, an extra £100 will be spent by anglers.
Let us assume that commercial catch is at or below the
maximum sustainable, and that commercial netting is restricted
so that 1,000 salmon are allowed upstream which would other-
wise have been caught by netsmen. The figures given in the 1972
Annual Report of the Salmon Research Trust (6) show that in the
Burrishoole river system in Co. Mayo, where the total number
of ascending salmon is counted, the percentage of the total
salmon stock in the system taken by anglers was about 22-24
per cent. If we assume that this is reasonably typical of the
State as a whole, then the efficiency rate of angling in Ireland
is 20 per cent.
This will give a catch of 200 salmon from our initial
1,000. In 1970, we have estimated that 15 per cent of the
catch went to visitors and 85 per cent to Irish residents. If we
assume that these proportions continue to hold, about 30 salmon
of this two hundred will be caught by visitors and 170 by Irish
anglers. We have also estimated that the catch for visiting
anglers is 1.1 lb per rod/day (= 0.16 salmon, at 7 lb per fish)
and the catch of Irish anglers is 1.0 lb per rod/day (= 0.14
salmon, again at 7 lb per fish). Thus, the 200 fish will yield
188 (= 30/.16) rod/days for visitors and 1,214 (= 170/.14)
rod/days for Irish anglers. Visitors spend an average of
(5) Whelan, B.J. et al "An Economic Evaluation of Irish Salmon Fishing,
III: The Commercial Fishermen" The Economic and Social Research Institute,
Paper No. 78, Dublin 1974.
(6) Salmon Research Trust of Ireland, Annual Report, 1972.
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about £7.2 per rod/day while Irish anglers spend about
£1.2 per rod/day. This gives a total expenditure of
about £2,800 for the 1,000 salmon (= 188 x 7.2 +
1,214 x 1.2), i.e. a value per fish of about £2.81.
The commercial value of a salmon in 1970 was about
£2.45.
Several qualifications to this illustrative example
must be kept in mind. In the first place, it makes many
assumptions about the constancy of the various proportions
involved. We assume that in the new situation the
proportion of Irish to visiting anglers remains constant.
This may not be valid if total stocks are considerably
above or below their 1970 levels. Furthermore, the
efficiency of angling may be somewhat high. Lower
rates would lead to a lower figure for value per fish.
Secondly, it should not be forgotten that a
certain proportion of the salmon which escape the
anglers will survive spawning, and return in later
years to provide either income for netsmen or sport
for anglers. If all the 1,000 fish are caught by netsmen,
this cannot happen.
Thirdly, it cannot be over-emphasised that the
above example refers to a situation where adequate
numbers are allowed to spawn. If the numbers of fish
upstream are below the spawning capacity of the river,
then allowing up this 1,000 extra fish will yield not only
a return of £2.81 per fish in the current year, but will
also yield returns to both anglers and netsmen in future
years. The advisability of restrictions on netting in this
case is obvious.
A fourth, and final, qualification relates to the
responsiveness of numbers of anglers to changes in the
stocks of salmon. In the above example, we have
assumed that, for each proportionate increase in the
numbers of catchable salmon, the rod/day and money
spent by anglers will increase in the same proportion.
The validity of this assumption* cannot be accurately
assessed at the moment.
However, the British National Angling Survey(5)
does show thsJt there are half a million game fishermen
in Britain, of whom, only about one in ten usually catches
salmon, but nearly half of whom would like to catch salmon
The economist might term this concept the elasticity of demand for salmon
angling with respect to the (expected) success rate. In the example, we have
assumed it to be equal to 1. It could just as easily have other values, either
greater or less than 1.0. An elasticity of greater than 1.0 would imply that the
above value per rod-caught fish of £2.81 is an underestimate, while an elasticity
of less than 1 would imply that this value is an overestimate. An attempt was made
to assess the elasticity by means of regression analysis, but the results were
unsatisfactory.
(5) National Opinion Polls Ltd., National Angling Survey, 1969-1970D London.
Natural Environment Research Council, April (1970).
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more than any other game fish. This is evidence of a large
and unsatisfied demand for salmon angling, and suggests
that increases in the salmon stocks in our rivers would be
matched by increases in the number of visiting anglers.
The choice between exploitation by angling or by
commercial methods is thus far from clearcut. It is
further complicated by the fact that, in places, whole
communities are dependent on commercial salmon fishing as
an important part of their livelihood. Excessively stringent
restrictions will hit these communities hard. On the other
hand, so would a decline in salmon stocks. Furthermore,
advocates of angling argue that angling is a far less "salmon-
intensive" way of creating income and employment than is
commercial fishing. That is, in a time of heavy pressure on
stocks, more income and employment would be provided by
angling than by commercial fishing. They also claim, with
some justification, that angling should be encouraged because
anglers help to protect rivers by reporting poaching and
pollution, so benefiting all fishermen.
The argument is sometimes taken even further and a
total ban on all commercial fishing is suggested. We feel that
this is too extreme a view in the present Irish context, as it
would probably lead to considerable wastage of fish which could
be harvested without long-term detriment to the stocks, or
severe losses in income and employment from angling. The
best course would seem to be to strike a balance between the
interests of those at various stages in the exploitation sequence.
These interests are frequently in conflict, and so this balance
will, implicitly or explicitly, involve value judgements.
However, the over-riding consideration of policy should be to
ensure the survival of our salmon stocks. Ultimately, this
must be to the benefit of all salmon fishermen."
The views expressed in this quotation apply even with greater force to the
Foyle and there is a strong case for the release of more spawning fish than at
present. Ideally this could be achieved by a curtailment of drift netting both in the
Letterkenny and Foyle districts, but if this does not prove adequate, closure periods
in the estuary will have to be lengthened. Having said this, howver, I must refer
to one point which has come to my notice through reading the Foyle Fishery Annual
Reports. Some years ago when angling licence fees were increased there was a
serious decline in the number of lieences purchased, and if this response is an
indication of "willingness to pay" then it might be said that Foyle anglers are not
prepared to pay as much for their salmon angling as many people would have us
think. We must be careful however with this type of interpretation. When people
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get used to a certain fee there is a strong resistance to having it increased, particularly
if the service provided (in this case the angling) is not too good. Hence the unwillingness
¯ to increase licence fee payments may be a reaction to various deeply felt grievances
and not a true indication of willingness to pay for the pleasure of salmon angling.
Having said this, however, it should be pointed out that the greatest benefit
to this country from angling will come from the overseas visitors. In 1970 the salmon
anglers who visited the Republic spent on average £190 each within the State. Of those,
visitors from Northern Ireland spent £86, those from Great Britain £195, those from
the rest of Europe £234, while those from the rest of the world (mainly USA) spent
£364 each. These are impressive figures, which indicate that visiting anglers should
be encouraged in every way. Hence if angling in the Foyle and its tributories is to be
improved, serious attempts should be made to attract out of State visitors, and
precautions taken to ensure that the visitors are properly treated, and not given the
worst waters in which to fish.
In conclusion, I should say that if netting in the estuary is to be curtailed the
future of the Commission’s fishery must be considered. As stated above, the funds
from this fishery are an important part of the Commission’s total revenue and regardless
of what other restrictions are imposed, the take in this fishery, must not (if possible)
be allowed to decline much further. This dilemma, however, is one which lies beyond
my brief to resolve. But even at its present level of operation, the Londonderry fishery
is not able to provide sufficient funds for its needs, particularly for the control of poaching.
In future, therefore, both netsmen and anglers will have to help with this operation. I
understand from the Foyle Fishery Annual Reports that co-operation in this regard is
already forthcoming and I sincerely hope that it can be continued. Indeed if the angling
were improved it would be possible to charge higher licence fees, which could be given
back to clubs again for the payment of part-time water keepers.
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Summary
Drift netting with sophisticated gear poses a serious threat to the Atlantic
Salmon in many rivers. Canadian stocks have been seriously reduced by the
Newfoundland drift netters. The Foyle is now in danger from its own and the
Burtonport drift netters as indicated by the declines in draft net catches in the
estuary in recent years.
The obvious solution to the Foyle problem is a firm control of drift netting
off the Irish coast. Minor restrictions are not sufficient. The large modern boats,
if allowed to operate freely, can cause grave damage to stocks. Despite the drift
netting danger, however, it is unlikely to be controlled sufficiently fob some time,
and until it has done much more obvious damage. Entrenched vested interests will
see to that. In the meantime, therefore, the Foyle Fishery will have to make the
best of a disimproving situation.
In these circumstances some authorities think that draft netting in the estuary
should be drastically if not completely curtailed. In my opinion, the banning of draft
netting, even if it could be implemented, would be both tmdesirable and ineffective
for the following reasons:
o
.
Netting provides some revenue for low income people and its
absence would mean increased social welfare payments.
Income from the Commission’s own lnetti,~g~operations provides
most of the revenue for the management of the whole catchment
area. If this income were foregone the protection of the fishery
would be imperilled.
.
Salmon is a valuable food fish. If netting were prohibited, local
prices would increase substantially and the poachers would take
over where the netters left off. This would be a most
undesirable situation.
Some combination of netting and angling seems therefore to be the only
solution, but what combination? If the aim is to maximise the number of fish taken
over time, a very small escapement from the nets would suffice for breeding purposes.
-15-
This however would give very poor angling and there are many who claim that quality
angling gives higher economic and social benefits than netting. Figures from the
Republic show that under certain circumstances this is so and indeed if the present
Northern troubles could be ended, and the angling improved, the income from salmon
angling could be greatly increased. There are thousands of British anglers who would
gladly spend their holidays in Ireland, North and South.
It behoves fishery management therefore to try and make a fair division
between netsmen and anglers. There is of course no objective or automatic mechanism
for doing this. It is really a question of hearing the conflicting arguments and trying
to arrive at some acceptable compromise. In all the discussion, however, it should
be made clear that the Commission’s own netting operations must be the last to be
sacrificed. If these go the future of the Foyle Fishery could be in danger.
